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The European Union and the United States:
Political Aspeets of the New Tlansatlantic Agenda of
SI.JIIIIT{ARY
On December 3, 1995, the United States and the European Union (pU)t
signed a "New Transatlantic Agenda" to guide their relationship into the next
century. The Agenda is based on a Framework forAction with four major goals:
(1) promotingpeace and stability, democracy and development around the world;
(2) responding to global challenges; (3) contributing to the expansion of world
trade and to the deepening of eeonomic relations; and (4) building bridges across
the Atlantic. Many observers argue that the Agenda is of largely symbolic,
rather than practical, importance for transatlantic political ties.
BACKGROUND
Since the end of the Cold War, concern has arisen on both sides of the
Atlantic that western Europe and the United States will drift apart because the
cement that held together their alliance for 50 years -- the Soviet threat -- is
gone. Transatlantic differences in policy over the war in Bosnia, NATO's future,
and relations with Iran have been identified as evidence of this drift. Further,
and perhaps more fundamental, the European Union has been focussing on its
deeper integration and on plans for eastward expansion. U.S. policy-makers
have appeared consumed by a pressing domestic agenda, and many Europeans
have perceived a "Pacific tilt" in U.S. foreign policy, which has given priority to
Asia and Latin America and has seemed to lack direction when it came to
Europe. Many Europeans also have worried about political trends in the United
States toward what they regard as neo-isolationism and unilateralism.
These concerns engendered a discussion, primarily on the European side,
as to how one might revitalize the European-American relationship. In the first
half of 1995, this topic was addressed in speeches by a wide range of European
officials. Much of the discussion concentrated on ways to broaden the alliance
lThe EU has 15 members: Austria" Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Sparn, France, Leland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.
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beyond the traditional security focus and to integrate the political, economic,
and security components. Various options were suggested, including an EU-U.S.
treaty and a trans-Atlantic free trade agreement (TAFTA).2 Oflicials wanted
to build on the Ttansatlantic Declaration, adopted in November 1990, which
provided a strengthened framework for regular EU-U.S. consultations, by
supplementing that consultation with joint action.s
In a major address on the Clinton Administration's policy toward Europe,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher on June 2, L995, stated that the goal of
the Administration was, by the end of 1995, to develop a "broad-ranging
transatlantic agenda for the new century -- an agenda for common economic and
political action to expand democracy, prosperity, and stability." In discussing a
comprehensive stratery for European securit5r, the Secretary pointed out that
"security comes first" and is "the bedrock of our partnership." However, he
explained that for this partnership to thrive, it must be comprehensive. Thus,
"specific steps in the economic and political arenas" are needed to "complement
and reinforce our security relationship."4 The speech was welcomed in Europe,
and seen as the strongest backing the Clinton Administration had given to calls
by European leaders for an initiative to strengthen and broaden transatlantic
links.
THE U.S.-EU I}TADRTD SLTMMIT OF DECEMBER 3, 1995
Secretary of State Christopher's speech marked the beginning of a six-
month period of U.S.-EU negotiations focussed on revitalizing the transatlantic
relationship, which culminated in the Madrid summit in December 1995.
President Clinton, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, whose country held
the EU's rotating presideney, and European Commission President Jacques
Santer signed the New Tlansatlantic Agenda on December 3. In Madrid,
President Clinton pledged that the United States would remain as closely tied
2See U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, European Proposals for a New Atlantic
Community, by Stanley R. Sloan, CRS Report 95-374 S, Mar. 10, 1995; ANew
Transatlantic Initiatiue? U.S.-EU Econnmic Relations in the mid-1990s, by
Glennon Harrison, CR.S Report 95-983 E, Sept. 15, 1995.
sThese meetings include biannual (twice-yearly) consultations between the
President of the Commission and the U.S. President; eonsultations between EU
Foreign Ministers, with the Commission, and the U.S. Secretary of State; and
biannual consultations between the Commission and the U.S. Government at
cabinet level.
4"Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century," Address by
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Casa de America, Madrid, Spain, June
2, L995.
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to Europe as it was during the Cold War: "Our destiny in America is still linked
to Europe."5
The United States and the European Union adopted two documents at thrs
summit. The first is a l0-page political declaration called the New Transatlantic
Agenda; the second is a 28-page action plan containing more than 150 concrete
steps to be taken in various fields by the two sides. In the words of Spanish
Foreign Minister Javier Solana, who is currently NATO's secretary general,
"[t]he two documents outline the most ambitious program of cooperation ever
established by the European Union with another country, clearly recognizing
that the relationship with the US is vital."6
In the declaration, the parties "reaffirm the indivisibility of transatlantic
securit5/" and declare NATO to be "the centerpiece of transatlantic security,
providing the indispensable link between North America and Europe." They
also note the need to adapt NATO's political and military structures to reflect
the developing European Security and Defense Identity.
The declaration goes on to explain that the New Transatlantic Agenda is
based on a Framework for Action with four major goals. First, the parties
agreed to promote peace and stability. democracy and development around the
world. Specific mention is given to the former Yugoslavia, Central and Eastern
Europe, Russia and Ukraine, T\rrkey, C5prus, and the Middle East. One
concrete initiative mentioned in this section is the establishment of a High-Level
Consultative Group to improve coordination of development and humanitarian
assistance activities, in light of shrinking financial resources on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Second, the United States and the European Union agreed to to
global challenges, such as international crime, drug traffrcking, terrorism, and
environmental issues. Both sides pledged to support training programs and
institutions for crime-fighting officials in Central and Eastern Europe, and the
former Soviet Union, as well as to develop an early warning system for
communicable diseases such as AIDS and the Ebola virus.
Third, they agreed to contribute to the expansion of world trade and closer
economic relations. The parties pledged to implement fully their Uruguay
Round commitments and support the World Ttade Organization, among other
things. One analyst pointed out that in "promoting trade, the thrust is...to seek
sAndres Wolberg-Stok, "EIJ, U.S. Sign Covenant for Thansatlantic Relations,"
Reuters, Dec. 3, 1995.
BJavier Solana, "Spain Shepherds Move to Strengthen EU-U.S. Links,"
International Herald Tribune, Dec. 2-3, 1995, p. 10.
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nitty-gritty progress in areas such as product certification and testing, which are
of immediate interest to business and col)sumers."7
Fourth, the parties agreed to build bridges across the Atlaritic "to ensu,:e
that future generations remain as committed as we are to developing a full and
equal partnership." The United States and the European Union felt that by
deepening commercial, social, cultural, scientific and educational ties, they could
strengthen public support for the transatlantic partnership. Among the
examples offered is the transatlantic business dialogue. The declaration also
advocates enhancing parliamentary links and states that parliamentary leaders
on both sides of the Atlantic will be consulted about what steps ought to be
taken.
The question of how the New Ttansatlantic Agenda will be implemented
receives brief mention at the end of the declaration. The Senior Level Group,
which includes sub-cabinet-level offrcials from the U.S. Administration, the
European Commission, and the EU Council Presidency (Italy succeeded Spain
in January 1996), will oversee work on the Agenda. The U.S. members of the
Senior Level Group are Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, and Joan Spero, Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural
Affairs. The regular U.S.-EU summits will be the forum in which progress can
be reviewed and priorities revised.
The Joint U.S.-EU Action Plan which accompanies the declaration follows
precisely the same outline, reviewing and then expanding on areas appropriate
for common action and cooperation within the four major categories. At 28
pages, the action plan offers greater detail than the declaration on possiblejoint
initiatives. For example, in the declaration the two sides pledged to work more
closely on preventive and crisis diplomacy; in the action plan, they single out
specific countries for mention in this context, such as Rrvanda, Burundi, Nigeria,
Haiti, Cuba, and Burma. How precisely joint diplomatic efforts would be
reinforced is not spelled out. Thus, the action plan has been referred to in some
circles as little more than a catalogue of issues of interest to both sides.
The purpose of the Madrid summit was three-fold: to aflirm the broad
basis for transatlantic cooperation which already exists; to extend that
partnership to additional political, economic, and cultural areas; and to broaden
participation to include not merely the executive branch of government, but also
the legislative branch and non-governmental actors, such as those in the
business, scientific, and educational communities. Stuart Eizenstat, U.S.
Ambassador to the European Union, said: '\[e see this as...giving us a joint
TReginald Dale, 'A Fresh Agenda for the Atlantic Rim," Internntionat Herald
Tribune, Dec. L2, 1995, p. 15.
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agenda so that we march into the next century as united as we were during the
Cold War and restimulate this mamiage."s
THE NEW TR.ANSATI"ANTIC AGENDA: AT.[ APPRAISAL
Outside comment on the initiative has been mixed, and has focussed on four
issues. First, is the Agenda primarily symbolic? The short answer is yes. Even
some oflicials in Europe and the United States have criticized the plan as a
glorified laundry list that is long on rhetoric, but short on substance. The two
sides agree on many principles and general goals, but few specific initiatives are
outlined. U.S. officials concede that the Agenda is not as ambitious as a U.S.-
EU treaty or a free trade area, ideas floated in the frst half of 1995, but they
contend that the Agenda's limited aims and pragmatism are precisely what they
sought. They claim to have achieved a focus on concrete steps that can be
carried out, though others see the Agenda proposals as nebulous. The Clinton
Administration may have wanted to produce a somewhat bland document that
avoided domestic controversy while at the same time reaffirming the closeness
of U.S.- European ties and assuaging European concerns over transatlantic drift.
Ambassador Eizenstat remarked: "We believe this demonstrates the continued
U.S. commitment to the primacy of the trans-Atlantic relationship in the post-
Cold War era."e Thus, the value of the Agenda may lie precisely in its
symbolism.
Second, does the Agenda demonstrate that the Europeans and Americans
will not drift apart in the post-Cold War period? Many observers would argue
that it does not. To take one example, a Financial Tim.es editorial argued that
"for all the professions of good will and close cooperation," the truth is that "the
US and EU are still struggling to find common ground and a clear framework
for their relations, since their common Soviet enemy was removed." The
editorial points to the lack of consensus over NATO enlargement to the east, the
"unseemly squabble" over appointing a new NATO secretary general, and
differing opinions about how the cost of rebuilding Bosnia should be
apportioned. The article concludes that "[t]he new transatlantic agenda will
help a bit by providing a practical road map. It will not fill the vacuum in
leadership apparent on both sides of the Atlantic divide."lo Nonetheless, while
agreement on a declaration and action plan cannot erase fundamental concerns
about transatlantic drift, the decision on both sides to expend political capital
to negotiate this agenda indicates the importance they attach to the
relationship. For the United States, the countries of the EU represent major
sJeremy Lovell, "Transatlantic Vision on Agenda for Madrid Talks," Reuters,
Nov.30, 1995.
eTom Buerkle, 'U.S.-EU Agreement Goes Part Way Toward Rescuing
Relations," International Hemld Tribune, Dec. 2-3, 1995, p. 6.
ro"Tlansatlantic Leadership," Financial Tim.es, Dec. 4, 1995, P. 17.
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political allies and critical trading partners. The agenda, at the least, serves to
reassure those allies and, at best, will lead to deeper ties.
Third, how "new" is the New Tlansatlantic Agenda? Agenda boosters
contend it wili ease European concerns about U.S. isolationism and
protectionism by committing the United States and the EU to act together on
a wide range of issues. However, most observers would argue that transatlantic
cooperation on these matters has existed for some time. Further, the limits that
hampered past cooperative efforts remainl those limits result from the fact that
European governments have not given the EU the power to be a full partner in
anything beyond commercial areas. Many of the issues outlined in the section
on "responding to global challenges," such as fighting international crime, drug
traflicking and illegal immigration depend on intergovernmental cooperation
within the EU and do not fall within the jurisdiction of the European
Commission.ll Thus, EU countries must first decide on how closely they want
to cooperate with each other on these challenges before they collectively could
work with the United States on meeting them. The wording in the declaration
is instructive. For instance, on combatting international crime, the document
reads that "we commit ourselves to active, practical cooperation between the
U.S. and the future European Police Oflice, EUROPOL" (italics added).
European decisions on foreign and defense poliry also depend on
intergovernmental cooperation and thus, while the declaration reaffirms the
centrality of NATO to European security and identifies the need for some
adaptation of N^A,TO's political and military structures to allow for a greater
European role, it engages in no discussion of how this migLrt be accomplished.
Finally, for many analysts the true test of transatlantic solidarity will be
the ongoing response to the war in Bosnia. U.S.-European policy differences
over Bosnia led to considerable strain in that relationship, but in recent months,
with the signing of the Dayton peace accords and the deployment of the NATO-
led Implementation Force (IFOR), transatlantic cooperation has been strong.
Most observers would agree that the problem of Bosnia has overshadowed all
other aspects of U.S.-European relations. One senior U.S. oflicial noted that
there was a collective sigh of relief after the Dayton peace accords were
concluded and President Clinton committed U.S. troops to IFOR, because the
Madrid summit no longer had "to hold together the open wound of Bosnia." The
extent and effectiveness of U.S.-European cooperation in Bosnia over the next
year are likely to have profound consequences for transatlantic ties
conseguences that will overshadow the diplomatic initiative reflected in the New
Transatlantic Agenda.
lrFor more on this, see U.S. Library of Congress. CRS. European Union:
Thc Eurcpean Community Euolues, by Karen Donfried. CRS Report 94-4L2F,
Updated August 2, L995.
